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Friedrich II: Nebraska Takes a
Closer Look at Automotive Design
Defect
Hancock v. Paccar, Inc. 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25
(1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are killed and injured in motor vehicle accidents in
alarming numbers each year. As traffic fatalities nationwide
reached a record-breaking 56,000 in 1972, safety authorities began
to concentrate on eliminating defects in motor vehicle design and
on improving highway engineering.' However, by October of 1979,
42,430 Americans had already lost their lives that year on the na-
tion's highways.2 Automobile accidents are reportedly the leading
cause of death among fifteen to thirty-four year-olds in the United
States.3
In Hancock v. Paccar, Inc.,4 the Nebraska Supreme Court once
again dealt with the highly controversial issue of manufacturer lia-
bility for injuries resulting from automotive design defect.5 In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Krivosha, the court noted similari-
1. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 24, 1978, at 47-48.
2. NATIONAL SAFETY CoUNcIL, MOTOR-VEHICLE DEATHS AND CHANGES (October
and Ten Months, 1979). The number of reported traffic deaths fell from 55,511
in 1973 to 46,402 in 1974 and to 45,853 in 1975. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
supra note 1. However, in 1976 the toll reached 47,038. In 1977, the trend con-
tinued upward with 49,510 fatalities. In 1978, the figure reached 51,500 killed.
NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, supra.
3. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL INFORMA-
TION ON HIGHWAY SAFETY (1977).
During 1978, there were 299 fatal crashes in Nebraska which claimed the
lives of 350 people. In the same period, 23,861 persons sustained non-fatal
injuries. NEBRASKA DEP'T OF RoADS, STANDARD SUMMARY OF NEB. MOTOR VE-
HICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (1978). By the end of 1979, 328 more Nebraskans
had lost their lives as the result of motor vehicle accidents. NEBRASKA DEP'T
OF ROADS, REPORT OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC DEATHS (Jan. 3, 1980).
4. 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979).
5. An earlier Nebraska decision, Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d
831 (1974), paved the way for an occupant of a motor vehicle to recover for
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ties between this case and its decision in Friedrich v. Anderson.6
Both cases involved an attempt to impose liability upon the manu-
facturer of a motor vehicle which inflicted injuries upon the occu-
pant during a collision. In Friedrich, the plaintiff was unable to do
so and suffered an adverse summary judgment,7 whereas a $251,180
verdict in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed in Hancock.8
The purpose of this note is to examine the concepts of
crashworthiness and enhanced injury as they relate to design de-
fect within the context of the facts in Hancock.9 Consideration will
be given to a suggestion that an attempt be made by the court in
the future to separate true "crashworthiness"' 0 cases from those in
which the design defect was a causal factor in producing the acci-
dent." It is asserted that such an approach may help maintain the
distinction between injuries which result from the initial collision
and those sustained solely on account of the occupant's impact
with the vehicle interior 2 or some other surface.' 3 Further, this
enhanced injuries sustained in a collision. The plaintiff in Friedrich, how-
ever, was unable to meet the burden of proof.
6. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Krivosha pointed out that "this case
might have been entitled 'Friedrich H."' 204 Neb. at 470, 283 N.W.2d at 30.
7. 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 837.
8. 204 Neb. at 489, 283 N.W.2d at 39. The action was brought for the wrongful
death of plaintiff's husband who was killed while operating a cab-over tractor
manufactured by the defendant.
9. Although not discussed in this note, the Hancock court held that the state of
the art defense refers to that which the industry was reasonably and econom-
ically capable of doing and not what the industry was in fact doing. 204 Neb.
at 479-80, 283 N.W.2d at 35. Neither will this note deal with the court's clarifi-
cation of misleading language found in Waegli v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 197
Neb. 824, 251 N.W.2d 370 (1977), and Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428,
191 N.W.2d 601 (1971), regarding the burden of proof with respect to the plain-
tiffs knowledge of the defect. According to Hancock:
No plaintiff should be required to prove the absence of all possible
defenses in order to recover. That burden properly belongs to the
defendant. To the extent that any confusion still remains we hold
that a plaintiff in a strict tort liability case is not required to plead
and prove he was unaware of the defect.
204 Neb. at 485-86, 283 N.W.2d at 38.
10. The term "crashworthiness" is used to refer to "the relative ability of an auto-
mobile to protect its passengers during the second collision." Note, Liability
for Negligent Automobile Design, 52 IowA L. REv. 953, 957-58 (1967). See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 646 (4th ed. 1971); Phillips, A Sy-
nopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L REV. 317,348
(1978). See also Comment, 118 U. PA. L REV. 299, 301, 310 (1969).
11. Even the strongest critics of the crashworthiness doctrine would allow recov-
ery where the alleged design defect caused or contributed to the cause of the
accident. See Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy"
Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. L REV. 1, 3, 6-7, 33,
77-78 (1974); Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness'" An Untenable
Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578, 584 (1971).
12. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (driver killed when struck head
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note suggests that the Nebraska Supreme Court ought to clearly
restraint); Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1975) (driver's leg
crushed when cab struck another truck); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (injuries sustained during 40 mph collision
of van into utility pole); Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir.
1971) (front seat passenger injured when rear seat occupant thrown against
back of front seat); Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970)
(occupant thrown through windshield); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (steering shaft shoved backward into driver's head
during collision); Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968) (injuries sustained by occupant of first
car struck in rear by automobile traveling 115 mph); Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (occupant killed
when vehicle struck broadside); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1959) (eye injured when occupant thrown against jagged edge of ashtray);
Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. N.C. 1977) (occu-
pant impaled on gear shifter); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 34 Cal. App. 3d
773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1973), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976)
(occupant struck prongs on steering column exposed when horn knocked
off); Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976)
(air suspension seat catapulted driver into cab roof); Rutherford v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975) (front seat slid back-
wards into rear seat passenger's leg during collision); Ford Motor Co. v.
Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970) (occupant struck knee on heater during
head-on collision); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969)
(occupant injured when seat broke during collision); Friedrich v. Anderson,
191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974) (eye injured when head struck gear shift
lever knob). Cf. Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 596 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1979) (driver's leg severed when bumper penetrated van's front panel during
collision); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (exploding
gas tank); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976) (fuel tank ruptured and roof supports failed during roll-over);
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (injuries due
to failure of roof to support weight of overturned car); Willis v. Chrysler
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (high speed collision caused police
car to break apart); Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1978) (ex-
ploding gas tank).
13. Shelak v. White Motor Corp., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978) (truck step broke
beneath driver's weight); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976)
(occupant thrown from vehicle when door latch released during broadside
collision); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (occupant
pinned beneath golf cart which tipped over); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973) (passengers ejected when roof came
off in accident); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1952) (occupant crushed when thrown from truck cab). Cf.
Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (motorcyclist injured
when struck by sharp metal piece on car's fender); Passwater v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (motorcyclist's leg mangled when
came into contact with ornamental wheel cover on automobile during colli-
sion); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968) (plain-
tiff's eye lacerated when bent down and came into contact with sharp edge on
window vent); Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D.
Kan. 1978) (motorcycle fuel tank caught fire); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.
Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (bicyclist drove into car tail fin); Hatch v. Ford
[Vol. 59:538
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distinguish between the doctrines of negligence and strict liabil-
ity,14 identifying upon which one a given opinion is based, since a
failure to do so tends to blur the standard for determining whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous as defined in Hancock.15 Fi-
nally, charges made in a strong dissent by Justice Clinton joined
by Justice Boslaugh that the majority's opinion makes the manu-
facturer an insurer16 and that the defendant's product was not un-
reasonably dangerous will be discussed.
II. THE HANCOCK DECISION
A. Facts
Early in the morning of September 12, 1971, plaintiff's husband
was killed while operating a Kenworth cab-over tractor manufac-
tured and sold by the defendant. 17 The accident occurred when
the tractor struck a deer on the highway while traveling at sixty
miles per hour.' 8 The impact bent the left side of the unbraced
lightweight aluminum bumper into a v-shape at a place where cut-
outs were located in front of the left wheel. This caused the
Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958) (pedestrian's eye pierced
when ran into radiator ornament on parked car).
14. Strict liability looks to the dangerous condition of a product as designed,
whereas negligence deals with the reasonableness of the manufacturer's ac-
tions in design and sale of the product. Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an
"Uncrashworthy" Automobile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444, 458 (1967); Note, Torts-
Products Liability-Strict Liability for Defect in Design, 40 Mo. L REV. 601,
602 (1978). See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 645, 649 (1967); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability for Defec-
tive Automobile Design, 42 WASH. L. REV. 601, 604-05 (1967).
15. The supreme court adopted the trial court's jury instruction regarding the
meaning of the term unreasonably dangerous: "[T] he product had a propen-
sity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary user or consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the foreseeable class of users as to its characteristics." 204
Neb. at 483-84, 283 N.W.2d at 37 (emphasis added). As pointed out in Brief for
Appellant in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 16, Hancock v. Paccar, Inc.,
204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979), this definition seems to conflict with the
court's later citation to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i,
(1965) for the rule that "unreasonably dangerous" means dangerous beyond
that which would be contemplated by the "'ordinary consumer' with 'ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community.' The section does not refer to
experts." 204 Neb. at 484, 283 N.W.2d at 37 (emphasis added).
16. According to some commentators and jurists, acceptance of the crashworthi-
ness theory makes automobile manufacturers virtual insurers since it is ar-
gnable in retrospect that every vehicle involved in an accident could have
been made safer. Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 489-91, 283 N.W.2d 25,
39-40 (1979) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, passim;
Hoenig & Werber, supra note 11, at 578.
17. 204 Neb. at 470-71, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
18. Id. at 471, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
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bumper to wedge itself between the wheel and the framerail. With
the steering effectively frozen in a left turn the tractor-trailer left
the highway, rolled and slid into a guardrail killing the driver.19
Hancock sought recovery based on theories of negligence and
strict liability.20 First, Hancock alleged that Paccar negligently
designed the front bumper by: making it too long, including cut-
outs and holes in the face of the bumper, failing to brace it at the
ends, and failing to test or inspect it. Plaintiff also alleged that the
bumper should have been made of a different material, one which
would not deform or would break away upon impact.2 1 Second,
under a theory of strict liability, Paccar was accused of marketing
the bumper without inspecting it for performance in the event of
impact at a time when the design was defective and not reasonably
fit for ordinary and foreseeable uses. 22 Following a jury verdict in
favor of Hancock 23 and a denial of Paccar's motion for a directed
verdict,24 Paccar appealed. 25
B. Holding
According to the Hancock opinion, Friedrich and Hancock in-
volved an examination of the doctrines of strict liability, design de-
fect and enhanced injury,26 plus the similar question of liability
under a theory of manufacturer negligence. 27 The Hancock court
noted that in Friedrich it had followed the Eighth Circuit Court of
19. Id.
20. Id. at 471-72, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 472, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 470, 283 N.W.2d at 30.
26. Id., 283 N.W.2d at 30-31.
27. Id. at 473, 283 N.W.2d at 32; Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. at 729-31, 217
N.W.2d at 835. Although the Friedrich court spoke only in terms of negli-
gence, the court in Hancock cited to Friedrich as authority for recovery under
the theory of strict liability. 204 Neb. at 474, 283 N.W.2d at 32. But see Com-
ment, Strict Tort Liability in Nebraska: Recent Developments in Perspective,
12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 370, 383 n.89 (1978); Note, 54 NEB. L. REv. 172, 179-81
(1975). It is especially curious that the Hancock court viewed Friedrich as a
strict liability decision since the principal case relied on in Friedrich was de-
termined on negligence grounds only. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
On the issue of strict liability or implied warranty of merchantibility
for intended use, we make no comment as our holding of sufficiency
of counts one and two are dispositive. The doctrine of strict liability
is one of policy for the various states and the National Congress, and
we do not think there has been a sufficient showing on the Michigan
law as respects this point, particularly in the automotive field.
See Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, at 37 n.128, 38 n.130; Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 818
[Vol. 59:538
AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN DEFECT
Appeals' landmark decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,28
which held that an automobile manufacturer had a duty to use rea-
sonable care in the vehicle's design to avoid subjecting the occu-
pant to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.2 9
According to Friedrich:
[A] manufacturer of goods has a duty to use reasonable care in the design
of goods to protect those who will use the goods from unreasonable risk of
harm while the goods are being used for their intended purpose or any
purpose which could be reasonably expected. The subjection of an auto-
mobile to accidental collision with another automobile or object while be-
ing used for its intended purpose is a use which a manufacturer should
reasonably expect.
30
However, the Friedrich court held that there was no substantial
evidence from which an inference of negligence could reasonably
be drawn regarding the design of a gearshift knob which the occu-
pant struck during a collision.3 1
In Hancock, the court reaffirmed the expansive Larsen stan-
dard it had adopted in Friedrich. Moreover, the Hancock court
again rejected the position advanced in Evans v. General Motors
Corp.,32 which limited design liability,33 noting that the Seventh
Circuit had since overruled Evans.34
(1962). But see Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in
the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559,574 (1969).
Some commentators have suggested that the test for liability is practically
the same under either negligence or strict liability. See Keeton, supra at 563;
Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARm L. REV.
233, 243 (1968); 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 233, 236 (1974); 24 VAND. L. REV. 862, 863
(1971). But see the court's statement in Hancock that "[t] he question of lia-
bility under a theory of strict liability poses a different question but in the
final analysis the same result." 204 Neb. at 474, 283 N.W.2d at 32.
28. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Larsen the driver was severely injured when a
defectively designed steering shaft of a Corvair was shoved rearward into his
head during a head-on collision.
29. Id. at 502.
30. 191 Neb. at 731-32, 217 N.W.2d at 836.
31. Id. at 732-33, 217 N.W.2d at 836-37.
32. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). In Evans, plaintiff's decedent was crushed when
the car he was driving was struck broadside by another. The plaintiff alleged
that the injuries sustained were enhanced by the "X" frame design of the
automobile.
33. According to Evans, a manufacturer is under no duty to design a "crash-
worthy" vehicle because "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not
include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufac-
turer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur." Id. at
825.
34. Chief Justice Krivosha poetically recognized that-
Time and the realities of life, however have narrowed the differences
between Evans v. General Motors Corporation ... and Larsen v.
General Motors Corporation ... until in 1977 the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of Huff v. White Motor
1980]
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In Huff v. White Motor Corp.,35 a case involving an exploding
fuel tank which killed the driver of a tractor-trailer manufactured
by the defendant, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took notice
of the fact that a majority of jurisdictions had followed Larsen in-
stead of Evans.3 6 The Huff court also recognized that commenta-
tors had been decisively critical of its earlier pronouncement in
Evans.3 7 The court relied on policy considerations expressed in
the Restatement of Torts which calls for placing the burden of acci-
dental injury caused by consumer products upon those who mar-
ket them.38 Accordingly, the Huff court rejected as "unrealistically
narrow"39 the "intended purpose" rationale of Evans4° which had
excluded foreseeable traffic accidents as a possibility to be
guarded against in automobile design.4 1 Huff recognized that a col-
lision is an obvious risk that a manufacturer may take precautions
against in order to decrease the potential for occupant injury.42 In
language which became the apparent cornerstone of the Hancock
opinion 43 the Huff court stated:
One who is injured as a result of a mechanical defect in a motor vehicle
should be protected under the doctrine of strict liability even though the
Corp., 565 F.2d 104, overruled their earlier decision in the Evans case,
and brought the Seventh Circuit into line with Larsen ....
204 Neb. at 474, 283 N.W.2d at 32.
35. 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 108. Huff conveniently listed those jurisdictions following Larsen and
Evans, respectively, in appendices following the opinion. The trend clearly
favors Larsen. See Comment, supra note 10, at 312. See also Nader & Page,
supra note 14, at 653. Contra, Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, at 13,20 n.68; but
see Hoenig & Werber, supra note 11.
37. 565 F.2d at 108.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A, Comment c (1965).
39. 565 F.2d at 108.
40. Two leading commentators have perceived the fallacy of the Evans approach
to "intended purpose" in the following manner.
'[I]ntended use and purpose' as a test to limit the manufacturer's
liability applies only to the conscious utilization of the product by its
operator. This distinction between such use and unplanned inci-
dents is not difficult to conceptualize. The person who uses his car to
knock over shrubbery in his back yard or to ford streams has gone
beyond the purposes for which the vehicle was manufactured. But
the driver who non-negligently loses control of his car while on the
road and crashes into a tree has clearly not transcended the use and
purposes for which the car was produced. The abnormal use test
should not be used to preclude manufacturers' liability in the latter
case.
Nader & Page, supra note 14, at 662-63. Accord, Comment, supra note 10, at
302.
41. See note 33 supra.
42. 565 F.2d at 108-09. See generally Keeton, supra note 27; Note, CREIGHTON L.
REV., supra note 27, at 239; Note, supra note 10, at 960.
43. 204 Neb. at 474-75, 283 N.W.2d at 32-33. Contra, notes 61-65 & accompanying
text infra.
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defect was not the cause of the collision which precipitated the injury.
There is no rational basis for limiting the manufacturer's liability to those
instances where a structural defect has caused the collision and resulting
injury. This is so because even if a collision is not caused by a structural
defect, a collision may precipitate the malfunction of a defective part and
cause injury. In that circumstance the collision, the defect, and the injury
are interdependent and should be viewed as a combined event. Such an
event is the foreseeable risk that a manufacturer should assume. Since
collisions for whatever cause are foreseeable events, the scope of liability
should be commensurate with the scope of the foreseeable risks. 4
Afffrming the district court's refusal to grant Paccar a directed
verdict, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that, unlike the circum-
stances in Friedrich, the conflicting evidence was sufficient to pose
questions of fact regarding the negligent and defective design of
the vehicle's bumper.45 The court then discussed several assign-
ments of error raised by Paccar regarding the plaintiffs burdens of
proof, instructions given by the trial court, and the allowance of
testimony by some of the plaintiffs witnesses. 46
m. ANALYSIS
A. "Crashworthiness" or Causation?
Automobile design may be defective in two ways. Design char-
acteristics may either pose an unreasonable risk of initial collision
or subject occupants to an unreasonable risk of enhanced injury
during the second collision.47 The second collision occurs when a
passenger strikes the inside of the passenger compartment, is
ejected therefrom or is injured in any other product-related man-
ner such as by fire, water damage or suffocation after the vehicle
has already collided with another vehicle or object.48 The injuries
so inflicted are called "enhanced injuries" because it is alleged that
a defect in design caused the occupant to be injured more seri-
ously during the second collision than he or she would have been
had the manufacturer used a vehicular design of a different size,
shape, construction or assembly.4 9
Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co.5 0 involved a design de-
fect which created an unreasonable risk of initial collision. In that
case a bus was designed with unprotected petcocks positioned
44. 565 F.2d at 109.
45. 204 Neb. at 478-79, 283 N.W.2d at 34.
46. Id. at 479-89, 283 N.W.2d at 34-39.
47. Comment, supra note 14, at 606-07; Note, supra note 10.
48. See Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, at 46; Phillips, supra note 10; Comment,
supra note 10, at 299; Note, supra note 10, at 957.
49. Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, at 3-4, 7; Hoenig & Werber, supra note 11. See
generally Note, NEB. L. REv. supra note 27, at 172-73. See also Note, supra
note 10, at 954.
50. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
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very low for efficient drainage of the vehicle's air chambers. 51
Such a design was said to create a risk of failure of the braking
system.5 2 When the petcock broke as it struck debris on the high-
way, air was allowed to escape from the braking system as the bus
descended a hill thus causing the vehicle to crash into a retaining
wall.53 Had it not been for the object striking the defectively
designed petcock, the accident would not likely have occurred.5 4
Nevertheless, the court held that the manufacturer had a duty to
guard against the likelihood of such an event because the interven-
ing cause was foreseeable. 55
In Hancock, the lightweight aluminum bumper designed with
cutouts directly in front of the wheels and unbraced ends posed an
unreasonable risk of interference with the steering of the tractor-
trailer.56 Just as in Carpini, had it not been for the "cooperation"
of the defectively designed component striking a foreign object on
the highway, the vehicle probably would not have gone out of con-
trol.5 7 Similarly, because the intervening cause of an animal dam-
aging the bumper so extensively as to interfere with the vehicle's
steering was foreseeable, 58 Paccar clearly had a duty to design its
truck bumpers so that impact with a deer would not cause such an
51. Id. at 406. (A petcock is a small drainage valve).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 405.
54. Note, CoRNEi.L L.Q., supra note 14, at 450 n.40.
55. Id.
56. 204 Neb. at 471, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
57. See note 65 & accompanying text infra.
58. The majority in Hancock stated:
Paccar was aware that the tractor trailer might strike an animal
on the highway while traveling at a high speed. Such events are com-
mon enough that the various departments of roads of several states
frequently post warnings to drivers to watch for animals, especially
deer crossing the road. Furthermore, Paccar knew that the makeup
of the bumper was such that, upon severe impact, the bumper would
bend backward wherever such bending was not otherwise prevented.
With that knowledge, it was not unreasonable to expect that the
manufacturer had taken steps and made tests to be sure that the
steering was not impaired upon impact.
204 Neb. at 478, 238 N.W.2d at 34. According to Nader & Page, supra note 14:
"Iraffic accidents from a wide variety of causes are foreseeable to the auto
manufacturer, and the absence or inadequacy of design features which might
protect vehicle occupants may be a sufficient reason to hold the manufac-
turer liable for injuries attributable to unsafe design." Id. at 658.
During 1969, the year in which Paccar manufactured the truck which Han-
cock was driving, 100 persons were killed nationwide after colliding with ani-
mals. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 58 (1976). In that year
1,433 motorists struck animals in Nebraska alone. Three persons were killed
and 156 others were injured. In 1,311 of those incidents, property damage ex-
ceeding $100 was sustained. NEBRASKA DEP'T OF ROADS, STANDARD SUMMARY
OF NEB. MOTOR VEmcLE TRAFc ACCIDENTS (1969).
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accident.5 9
The similarities between Carpini and Hancock are so striking
that it is remarkable that the court in Hancock did not cite to that
decision.60 Perhaps the court was too anxious to base its opinion
on a crashworthiness analysis. Alternatively, the decision may re-
flect a failure to discern the very subtle distinction between a de-
sign defect which is a causal factor in producing an accident and
one which creates an unreasonable risk of injury once an accident
has occurred. Hancock may be characterized as a crashworthiness
case if the impact of the deer with the truck's bumper is consid-
ered the initial collision and the second collision characterized as
when the out-of-control vehicle slid into the guardrail and inflicted
fatal injuries upon the driver.61 The problem with such a charac-
terization is that Hancock sought to impose liability upon the man-
ufacturer on the basis of the bumper's performance when it struck
the deer, thus causing a loss of control over the vehicle. The plain-
tiff's theory of recovery did not specifically draw into question the
bumper's performance thereafter in a second collision.62
Enhanced injuries may occur at the same time as the original
accident-causing event.63 However, that is quite different from
saying that the original accident-causing event enhances injuries
within the meaning of crashworthiness. For example, an occupant
of a vehicle whose gas tank ruptures on account of being struck
from the rear by another automobile may suffer enhanced injuries
such as burns from the explosion and flames that occur contempo-
raneously with the original accident-causing event. However, the
enhanced injuries are caused by the defectively designed gas tank
59. As a general rule of law, foreseeable intervening acts of causation are not
deemed superseding causes but must be guarded against by the defendant.
See, e.g., W. PROSSEF, supra note 13, at 272; Nader & Page, supra note 14, at
658. Furthermore, a manufacturer ought not to be relieved of liability be-
cause of an intervening force of nature short of extraordinary. Note, supra
note 10, at 969.
60. Neither did the parties cite Carpini in briefs. Briefs for Plaintiff and Defend-
ant, Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979).
61. That is apparently how the court viewed the facts as revealed by the follow-
ing statement: "No good reason exists for not applying the doctrine of strict
liability to a case where the defective design results in an enhanced injury to
the plaintiff even though the product designed did not cause the initial colli-
sion." 204 Neb. at 476, 283 N.W.2d at 33.
62. Compare text accompanying note 47 supra, with the facts of Friedrich where
the complaint was based on the performance of an undersized gear shift lever
knob which was struck by the passenger's eye as he was thrown forward
when his auto was struck by another, and Larsen where a steering shaft was
thrust into the driver's head after the car had been struck head-on, and Huff
where the fuel tank ruptured, caught fire, and burned the driver after the
truck had jacknifed and struck an overpass support.
63. Phillips, supra note 10.
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which is unable to protect the occupant from the effect of the im-
pact of the second automobile and not by the original accident-
causing event itself, which may have produced its own injury such
as whiplash. Recall that "crashworthiness" means the ability of a
vehicle to protect its occupant during the second collision and "en-
hanced injuries" are those which are more serious than the inju-
ries would have otherwise been. Larsen clearly teaches that
manufacturer liability for enhanced injury is coextensive with the
extent of the injury "over and above the damage or injury that
probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision
absent the defective design."64 Absent the defectively designed
bumper no injury probably would have occurred at all.65 There-
fore, to designate the injuries received by the deceased in Hancock
as a result of the original accident-causing event as "enhanced", is
a misnomer. Instead, it is clear that Hancock, just like Carpini,
involved a design defect which caused the fatal accident and the
Nebraska Supreme Court could have decided the case on that
ground.
B. "Unreasonably Dangerous" After Hancock
According to most authorities, the theories of negligence and
strict liability are distinct.66 Under a theory of negligence the court
is asked to examine the manufacturer's conduct in light of the duty
of care owed the consumer.67 Under strict liability the focus is
upon the product, the concern being whether the product is defec-
tive and poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the consumer.68
Whether a manufacturer acted negligently in the design, manu-
facture or distribution of a product is determined by comparing the
defendant's conduct with that of a reasonable manufacturer under
the same or similar circumstances. 69 The maker-seller is liable if
the product is reasonably expected to be capable of inflicting sub-
stantial harm if defective,70 since a reasonable manufacturer
64. 391 F.2d at 503.
65. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that had the truck been equipped with an
alternative bumper which was shorter, would break away on impact or would
not deform, impact with a deer would not have affected the steerability of the
vehicle. Brief for Appellee at 25-27, Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283
N.W.2d 25 (1979). Testimony of the defendant's expert witness was contra.
Brief for Appellant at 37. However, the jury apparently believed plaintiff's
witness and the supreme court chose not to interfere. 204 Neb. at 481, 283
N.W.2d at 35-36.
66. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 644.
70. Id. at 643.
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would not have marketed the product 71 or else would have warned
those who might be harmed by it.72
Strict liability requires that the product have been defective
while in the control of the manufacturer. 73 The other requirement
is unreasonable danger.74 There are two generally accepted stan-
dards for determining when a product is unreasonably dangerous.
According to the Restatement75 standard, a product is unreasona-
bly dangerous when it is more dangerous than the ordinary con-
sumer would expect.76 The other standard is known as the Wade-
Keeton analysis 77 or the reasonable manufacturer test.
78 Under
that test, a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is so unsafe that
a reasonably prudent manufacturer with imputed knowledge of its
harmful design would not have placed it on the market.
79
In Hancock, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the trial
court's definition of "unreasonably dangerous" which was a slight
variation on the Restatement's ordinary consumer standard.
80 The
court stated that the jury was justified in concluding that the
bumper's design was unreasonably dangerous 8 ' since the possibil-
ity of the bumper bending so radically upon impact with a deer
was not obvious to the deceased.82 Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that since a plaintiff does not have a duty to anticipate de-
71. See Note, NEB. L. REV., supra note 27, at 182.
72. Nader & Page, supra note 14, at 649.
73. Note, CORNELL L.Q., supra note 14, at 457. See 204 Neb. at 476, 283 N.W.2d at
33.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Nebraska law requires that a product be both defective and unreasonably
dangerous before recovery is allowed under strict liability. In Kohler v. Ford
Motor Co., 187 Neb. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 607 those requirements were stated
separately in the jury instructions. Also, in Hancock the court cited to Nanda
v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 218-19 (7th Cir. 1974) for the rule that "[iun
order to recover against the manufacturer under [strict liability], plaintiff
must prove that his injury resulted from a condition of the product, that the
condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed
at the time it left the manufacturer's control." 204 Neb. at 482-83, 283 N.W.2d
at 36. But cf. Nader & Page, supra note 14 (defective means unreasonably
dangerous).
For an excellent discussion of the relationship between defect and unrea-
sonable danger, see generally Note, Analyzing "Defect" in New York Products
Liability Law. The Proof is in the Product, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1217, 1247-49
n.214.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
76. Id.
77. Note, Mo. L. REV., supra note 14, at 609.
78. Note, supra note 74, at 1250-51 n.225.
79. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,
839-40 (1973).
80. 204 Neb. at 483-84, 283 N.W.2d at 37. See note 15 supra.
81. 204 Neb. at 484, 283 N.W.2d at 37.
82. Id. at 482, 283 N.W.2d at 36.
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fects 83 or speculate as to modes of injury,84 the defective bumper
posed a danger beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary trucker. The court made the following observation and
conclusion:
Paccar knew the wheel was unprotected from the bumper. It also knew it
had not designed the bumper to protect the wheel from large objects,
likely to be struck by the truck at high speeds, which, upon impact, might
bend the bumper impairing steering. Yet no action was taken by the man-
ufacturer to protect the wheel from such impairments. That was sufficient
to raise a question of fact as to whether the bumper in its present condi-
tion was unreasonably dangerous.
8 5
It must be noted, however, that within the definition of "unreason-
ably dangerous" adopted by the court, Paccar's knowledge should
have been irrelevant.86
In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,8 7 the Texas Supreme
Court held that an "unreasonable risk of harm" could be found
under either the consumer expectations test or the reasonably
prudent manufacturer test.88 It is possible that the Nebraska
Supreme Court has likewise expanded strict liability to include
the reasonable manufacturer test as the foregoing facts concerning
what Paccar knew would seem to indicate. However, that possibil-
ity is not likely since the Hancock court's definition of "unreasona-
bly dangerous," closely resembling the - Restatement's ordinary
consumer test,8 9 appears to be exhaustive. Moreover, no mention
was made of the reasonable manufacturer test in the opinion. Fur-
thermore, the court admitted that it had not previously defined
"unreasonably dangerous" in a strict liability case.90
Another possible interpretation is that the court's recitation of
Paccar's knowledge was intended to illustrate that Paccar's failure
to test or inspect its bumper was an omission that the ordinary
user would not have contemplated. According to Hancock, "a con-
sumer may reasonably expect that the manufacturer has per-
formed a minimum number of tests and inspections to assure that
a collision at speeds of normal use of the vehicle will not cause an
enhanced injury."9 1 However, the facts recited did not address
83. Id. at 483, 283 N.W.2d at 36.
84. Id. at 482, 283 N.W.2d at 36.
85. Id. at 484, 283 N.W.2d at 37.
86. Paccar's attorney succinctly answered his own question about what Paccar's
knowledge had to do with whether the bumper was unreasonably dangerous:
"Nothing." Brief for Appellant in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 16, Han-
cock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 482, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979).
87. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
88. Id. at 347 n.l.
89. See note 15 supra.
90. 204 Neb. at 483, 283 N.W.2d at 37.
91. Id. at 477, 283 N.W.2d at 34.
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Paccar's failure to test or inspect the bumper. Instead, they dealt
with Paccar's failure to guard against steering impairment.
Hancock sought recovery under strict liability and negligence92
and the supreme court allowed plaintiff to proceed on both theo-
ries. 93 Thus, the court's concern with Paccar's knowledge of the
likelihood that its bumper would bend backward and impair steer-
ing upon severe impact was appropriate in order to determine
whether Paccar fell below the negligence standard of care. How-
ever, since the test for strict liability focuses on the dangerousness
of the product and not the negligence of the manufacturer, 94 Pac-
car's knowledge had nothing to do with whether the bumper was
unreasonably dangerous under the consumer expectations test.
To say that it did9 5 adds unnecessary confusion to a determination
of unreasonable danger and illustrates the need for the Nebraska
Supreme Court to recognize and formulate the distinction that ex-
ists between the doctrines of negligence and strict liability.
C. Dissent's Charges Examined
1. Defect and the Danger
The dissent96 in Hancock argued that Paccar's bumper was
neither negligently designed nor unreasonably dangerous. 97 Ac-
cording to the dissent, this was because "[t]he purpose of a
bumper on a motor vehicle is not to guard against damage to either
persons or property on high speed impacts."98 The fallacy of that
argument is evident from the statement. Although a bumper's pur-
pose may not be to protect the occupants or the vehicle in an acci-
dent, its purpose is also not to bend in such a way that it impairs
vehicle steerability and causes an accident. The dissent's empha-
sis on the purpose of the bumper is misplaced because whatever a
bumper's purpose is, Paccar's bumper did not perform in accord-
ance therewith. Therefore it was defective.
92. Id. at 471-72, 283 N.W.2d at 31.
93. According to the opinion: "If the plaintiff could prove that Paccar did in fact
design a bumper in a negligent manner and the negligence was the proximate
cause of deceased's injury and death, then under a common law theory of
negligence, plaintiff could recover." Id. at 472-73,283 N.W.2d at 32. 'The ques-
tion of liability under a theory of strict liability poses a different question but
in the final analysis the same result." Id. at 474, 283 N.W.2d at 32. Further-
more, the Hancock court spoke interchangeably of negligence and strict lia-
bility throughout the opinion and syllabus.
94. Keeton, supra note 27, at 568. See notes 66-79 & accompanying text supra.
95. 204 Neb. at 484, 283 N.W.2d at 37.
96. Justice Clinton wrote the dissenting opinion to which Justice Boslaugh
joined.
97. 204 Neb. at 490, 283 N.W.2d at 40.
98. Id.
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Although the dangerousness of the bumper's design did not be-
come obvious until the accident, that is no ground for saying that
the bumper "had no propensity to cause harm."99 As the court's
opinion noted, the design of the bumper was defective from the
time the manufacturer designed it.100 Therefore, it too had a "pro-
pensity to cause harm" despite the dissent's claim to the contrary.
Although courts were once hesitant to impose liability where only
design defects without accompanying defects in construction or as-
sembly were involved,101 that is no longer the case. The over-
whelming weight of authority recognizes that manufacturers have
a duty to guard against design defects.102
Not only was the bumper dangerous in the sense that it had a
propensity to cause harm, according to the majority it was also un-
reasonably dangerous.103 The dissent, on the other hand, consid-
ered the bumper an unavoidably unsafe product'0 4 and not
dangerous beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer.
"[I]t is common knowledge that bumpers on motor vehicles are
not designed to avoid damage and injury in high speed impacts.' 1 0 5
While that may be true, it is not common knowledge that after
striking an animal a bumper will bend in such a manner so as to
impair steering and cause a tractor-trailer to go out of control. 06
2. Paccar not an Insurer
Bolstered by a belief that in view of the Friedrich decision
neither a cause of action based on strict liability nor negligence
had been made out by Hancock,0 7 the dissent urged that the ma-
jority opinion allowed those doctrines to be extended to the point
99. Id.
100. Id. at 476, 283 N.W.2d at 33.
101. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARv. L. REV. 863, 863 (1956); Nader & Page, supra note 14, at 645;
Comment, supra note 14, at 601; Note, CORNELL L.Q., supra note 14, at 447.
This hesitancy was probably due to judicial reluctance to let juries pass on
issues of damage apportionment and evaluate products created by automo-
tive design experts. Undoubtedly there was also some concern with the fa-
miliar "flood of litigation" and fears of mass "recalls." Nader & Page, supra
note 14, at 663; Comment, supra note 10, at 303-05; Note, supra note 10, at 955-
57.
102. Note, CORNELL L.Q., supra note 14, at 447. See also text accompanying note
36; Comment, supra note 10, at 312; Nader & Page, supra note 14, at 653.
103. 204 Neb. at 483-84, 283 N.W.2d at 37.
104. The dissent cited RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k
(1965) which states in part- "There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use."
105. 204 Neb. at 492, 283 N.W.2d at 41.
106. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
107. 204 Neb. at 489, 283 N.W.2d at 39.
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of essentially making the manufacturer an insurer that its product
design was incapable of inflicting injury.108 According to the dis-
sent, the court invented a theory after the fact to impose liability
upon Paccar' 09 by accepting the plaintiff's contention that an alter-
native bumper design would have avoided the injury."0
The dissent was not alone in its assailment of the court's view.
Critics of the crashworthiness doctrine have urged that every im-
aginable design feature can be questioned after an injury-produc-
ing accident has occurred."' However, the requirement that a
suspected design feature be defective and unreasonably danger-
ous" 2 limits the imposition of liability and prevents the manufac-
turer from becoming the absolute insurer of its product.113 In
other words, it is not enough for an injured consumer to show that
there was a safer alternative design available. The plaintiff must
also prove that the design used was dangerous beyond the expec-
tations of the ordinary user. In addition, recovery is dependent
upon a showing of injury proximately resulting from the impugned
design." 4 The dissent argued strenuously that the same result
might have occurred even using the alternative bumper designs of-
fered by the plaintiff."15 However, the majority correctly held that
the evidence on proximate cause was in conflict and thus
presented a question for the jury.116
Closely related to the issue of a manufacturer as insurer is the
often-repeated rule that a manufacturer has no duty to design an
108. Id. at 489-90, 283 N.W.2d at 39. Justice Clinton's appraisal of the court's opin-
ion as being an abdication of judicial responsibility to define the limits of the
legal doctrines involved is curious considering that Clinton did not dissent
from the Friedrich opinion where the actual doctrinal growth of negligence
and perhaps strict liability with respect to vehicular design took place. Han-
cock simply allowed the jury to decide whether the product design was de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous since there was sufficient conflicting
evidence to pose a question of fact: The rule adopted in Friedrich that a sec-
ond impact case should not be an "open invitation to a jury to speculate as to
the issue of foreseeability or the unreasonableness of the risk of harm" is
merely the antithesis of the familiar rule that there be sufficient evidence
upon which a jury can properly proceed as determined beforehand by the
court. 191 Neb. at 732, 217 N.W.2d at 836.
109. 204 Neb. at 491, 283 N.W.2d at 40.
110. Id. at 490, 283 N.W.2d at 40.
111. Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 11, passim; Hoenig & Werber, supra note 11.
112. See note 74 supra.
113. According to Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 797 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976), a
manufacturer would become an insurer only if liability were imposed in the
absence of a defect alone.
114. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1977). Regarding all the
requirements, see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 671-76.
115. 204 Neb. at 490-91, 283 N.W.2d at 40.
116. Id. at 481, 283 N.W.2d at 35-36. See note 65 supra.
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"accident-proof' or "fool-proof" product.117 The dissent in Han-
cock stated the rule as follows: "A manufacturer does not have a
duty to design a product which represents the ultimate in safety or
design, but rather, has a duty to design a product which is reason-
ably safe." 1 8 The problem with that contention is that the bumper
was not reasonably safe. On the contrary, it was unreasonably
dangerous and it is clear that the rule was not meant to defeat re-
covery in that situation.119
IV. CONCLUSION
In the opinion of some observers, the Hancock decision repre-
sents a fundamental political shift toward liberalism and con-
sumerism in the Nebraska Supreme Court. 120 With respect to the
adoption of legal standards governing manufacturer responsibility
for design safety, Friedrich is actually more significant. Also, the
quarter-million-dollar judgment affirmed in Hancock may be con-
servative in comparison to multi-million-dollar verdicts for injuries
and death caused or enhanced by automobile design defects
awarded elsewhere.' 2 '
One thing is certain: Hancock and its predecessor, Friedrich,
clearly signal the motor vehicle industry's heightened duty to an-
ticipate vehicle accidents and accordingly design its products in or-
der to minimize the chance of injury. If awareness of potential
liability prompts the industry toward more thoughtful design, then
both decisions will have done much to curb traffic casualties.
Kent Campbell '81
117. E.g., Larsen v. General Motor Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966); Willis v. Chrysler
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Noel, supra note 29; Phillips,
supra note 10, at 349.
118. 204 Neb. at 491, 283 N.W.2d at 40.
119. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); Noel, supra
note 29; Phillips, supra note 10, at 349. See Nader & Page, supra note 14, at
656.
120. Lincoln Journal, Sept. 5, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
121. Consider, for example, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 197761 & 199397
(Super. Ct., Orange County, Cal. Feb. 6, 1978); appeal docketed, No. 20095 (Ct.
Civ. App. 4th Dist. April 26, 1978) where $2,841,000 compensatory and $125 mil-
lion punitive damages were awarded to a young boy who was burned se-
verely when the 1972 pinto in which he was riding burst into flames after
being struck from the rear. The verdict was reduced to $6.3 million upon re-
mittitur.
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